Rabobank examines the state of online supermarket sales and its implications for logistics. Online grocery shopping has firmly established itself across Europe. That is the main conclusion of a recent RaboResearch report. After the turbulent growth years around the COVID pandemic and the sharp correction that followed, the market is now normalizing. Consumers treat online ordering as a straightforward option alongside in-store shopping.
A maturing channel, but unevenly distributed
Europe shows a wide variation in online grocery penetration. In the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, the channel is already substantial. In Germany, Italy, and Spain, it still accounts for only marginal shares of total supermarket turnover — 2.5%, 1.7%, and 1.3% respectively.
Rabobank expects online grocery in those three markets to stay below 3% to 5% over the next five years, unless retailers invest heavily in marketing and infrastructure. Even in the more mature markets, a low double-digit share — ten to fifteen percent — appears to be the ceiling.
The online market is also more concentrated than the overall grocery market. Large traditional retailers dominate digitally as well: Tesco now generates around 14% of its UK revenue online, and Asda nearly 18%. In France, E.Leclerc’s share of domestic grocery sales online stands at around 13%. Discounters like Aldi and Lidl are deliberately staying on the sidelines. Online grocery is incompatible with their ultra-lean cost model and dense store network.
Growth without profit: the structural cost challenge
The strategic logic of selling online is clear enough for supermarkets: economies of scale, stronger negotiating positions with suppliers, richer data for retail media. But profitability remains elusive.
Ahold Delhaize only made its US e-commerce operations profitable in the first half of 2025. Mercadona’s online channel in Spain reached break-even only in 2024, after years of build-up. Ocado Retail posts positive EBITDA but remains loss-making at the net level. Picnic Netherlands is EBITDA-positive but still reports red figures. After ten years of operating, Rohlik is profitable in the Czech Republic but loss-making at the group level.
Rabobank concludes that the problem does not lie in asset utilization — which is comparable to conventional food retail — but in operating margins. Costs are simply too high relative to turnover:
- Transactional apps and websites require continuous development and security investment, far beyond what an informational web presence demands.
- Staff and energy remain necessary even with advanced automation, particularly for last-mile delivery.
- Technology licenses for automation systems, software, and fulfillment solutions are expensive.
- Infrastructure investment: new fulfillment centers, repurposing of existing locations, click-and-collect points, and delivery fleets.
- Platform fees: working with Uber Eats or Deliveroo typically incurs at least 15% commission on the order value.
Last-mile as the core problem
Last-mile delivery is structurally the most expensive component of online grocery. Scale and density are critical to spreading fixed costs and reducing the cost per delivery order, but there is no universal formula. It depends on the fulfillment model (from stores, hubs, or automated warehouses), the demographic structure of the catchment area, and consumer behavior.
Click-and-collect significantly reduces last-mile costs, but does not work everywhere. In France, the model has taken firm hold through large drive-through collection points at hypermarkets. In Sweden, it never caught on. In the Netherlands and the UK, a mix of home delivery and collection is emerging, with considerable variation between retailers.
Rabobank notes that retailers are increasingly opting for hybrid models: own delivery where it is more efficient, and outsourcing to third parties where it proves cheaper. For city-center supermarkets — compact branches of major chains or specialized stores — platforms like Uber Eats and Deliveroo can offer an effective way to maintain an online presence without building proprietary logistics capacity.
Consolidation and selective participation
In the years ahead, Rabobank expects further consolidation. The market will be dominated by a handful of strong omnichannel retailers, complemented by one or two specialized pure players and the major delivery platforms. Those unable to achieve sufficient scale and density to operate the channel profitably are better off pulling out. Oda has already withdrawn from Germany and Finland. BILLA exited Austria and the Czech Republic.
For suppliers, the bar is rising. Pack sizes, product formats, and marketing strategies need to align with the logistical realities of e-commerce fulfillment. That demands flexibility and close cooperation with the retailers that will increasingly dominate the market.
What does this mean for city logistics?
Online grocery continues to grow, albeit more moderately. That translates into a sustained stream of delivery trips in urban areas. The pressure to make last-mile delivery cheaper, more efficient, and — particularly in cities with zero-emission zones — cleaner, is only increasing. Retailers that manage to control their fulfillment costs while meeting urban access requirements will build a structural competitive advantage. Those that cannot will exit the channel or outsource delivery entirely to the platforms.
The Rabobank report confirms what is already visible in practice: online supermarket delivery is no longer an experiment but a permanent feature of urban freight flows. The only question is who can make it profitable in the long run.
Source: Maria Castroviejo, RaboResearch — ‘The coming of age of online grocery in Europe’, May 2026